Bahrain after the elections by unknown
B A H R A I N 
AFTER THE 
ELECTIONS
Workshop Report 
March 2015
Cover image: 'Bahrain Streets', poster depicting the king of Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. © 2014 Daniel Frauchiger, all 
rights reserved. 
The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and speakers(s) and do not necessarily represent 
those of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) or the Kuwait Programme. This document is issued on 
the understanding that if any extract is used, the LSE Kuwait Programme should be credited, preferably with the date of the 
publication. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the material in this report, the author(s) and/or the LSE 
Kuwait Programme will not be liable for any loss or damages incurred through the use of this report.
Bahrain after the Elections
Workshop Report 
March 2015
LSE Kuwait Programme
Kuwait Programme | Middle East Centre
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street | London WC2A 2AE 
@LSEKuwait | lse.ac.uk/lsekp
INTRODUCTION
In November 2014 Bahrain held its first parliamentary 
elections since the anti-government protests erupted 
in 2011. With the main Shi’a opposition party al-Wefaq’s 
boycott of the elections and the subsequent arrest of 
its leader Ali Salman, the role of the elections in deter-
mining the future of Bahrain was questioned. 
On 21 January 2015, the LSE Kuwait Programme organ-
ised a workshop entitled ‘The Future of Bahrain after 
the Elections’. Held under the Chatham House rule, the 
workshop brought together academics, researchers, 
UK government officials and civil society organisation 
representatives. This half-day workshop was organised 
into two sessions, each opened by a presentation by 
one speaker, followed by a group discussion. This report 
summarises the proceedings of the event. 
THE NOVEMBER 2014 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS
The speaker’s initial presentation focussed on the 
following three broad issues and questions:
The results of the elections
What conclusions can be reached from the level of 
participation? How did political societies perform? 
How do the results affect al-Wefaq, the largest oppo-
sition group, who boycotted the election? How did 
Muslim Brotherhood organisations perform? What is 
the significance of the fact that most of the election 
campaigning focused on pragmatic issues such as 
services and housing?
The political strategy of the opposition and 
government after the opposition’s boycott
How was the election boycott viewed by the Bahraini 
public? How significant are the divisions within 
al-Wefaq? Did the opposition have alternative strat-
egies? What was the impact and purpose of the 
Government’s redistricting of constituency boundaries 
prior to the election?
The role of the parliament in the future
What can this parliament achieve in the future? Will 
this parliament cooperate with the government? Is the 
Bahraini government’s strategy to use the parliament 
to reach out to the opposition? What are the chances 
of political reconciliation in the near future?
Discussion
Several participants questioned whether any accu-
rate conclusions could be drawn about public opinion 
from the election result, arguing that the government 
had manipulated the vote by changing the electoral 
boundaries and by pressuring people to vote through 
the mechanism of stamping the passports of those 
who did. According to several participants, fewer, 
centralised polling stations were used to give the 
impression of a higher turnout. One participant argued 
that all of the above suggested that the elections were 
rigged, leading to the question of to what extent were 
the elections rigged. However, it could be argued that 
simply by analysing the results and outcome of the 
election, one is legitimising them.
Several participants suggested the election was 
simply not an important event compared to what had 
been happening outside of parliament, noting that 
the Bahraini government had recently arrested two 
prominent opposition figures, al-Wefaq’s leader Sheikh 
Ali Salman and human rights activist Nabeel Rajab. 
Furthermore, the parliament itself, unlike the Kuwaiti 
National Assembly, had relatively little power, and 
therefore the newly elected parliamentarians would be 
unable to push for change, even if they wanted to.
There was broad pessimism among the participants 
of the workshop about the elections being a vehicle 
for reconciliation in Bahrain. Though the elections were 
framed by both the government and outside states as 
evidence of progress and resolution, several partici-
pants believed the Bahraini government’s strategy was 
in fact to use the elections to fracture and divide the 
opposition, aiding further repression. If this was the 
outcome then, it was argued, Bahraini society and poli-
tics are likely to become more polarised as a result.
Al-Wefaq’s response to the elections and its future role 
in Bahraini politics was then discussed in detail. Several 
participants noted that al-Wefaq may well be pushed 
aside by more radical, youth-orientated elements of 
the opposition. This scenario was being made more 
likely with the Bahraini government continuing to arrest 
the leaders of the established, non-violent opposition. 
Hence, by emptying society of people that they can 
have a conversation with, the Bahraini government is 
empowering radicals.
Many participants drew attention to the recent 
announcement that Britain would be establishing a 
military base in Bahrain, linking it with what they saw 
as British silence regarding human rights abuses in 
Bahrain. It was argued that the announcement would 
have an important influence on Bahraini politics, in 
effect strengthening the Bahraini government’s posi-
tion, while indicating to the opposition that they will 
not succeed in lobbying for international assistance 
for their cause. Whether and to what extent British 
diplomats had pressured al-Wefaq to participate in the 
elections was also discussed.
THE FUTURE OF BAHRAIN
The speaker’s initial presentation focussed on the 
following three broad issues and questions:
Political deadlock
It is unlikely to be a political solution to the crisis in 
the near future. As long as the current Prime Minister 
remains in place, there will be little opportunity for 
compromise.
Economy
Broadly, the Bahraini economy is in poor health, with 
massive capital flight since 2011. Bahrain’s attractive-
ness for highly skilled expatriate workers has also 
been badly damaged by the on-going protests. In 
addition, a continued low oil price would likely put a 
substantial strain on the Bahraini-Saudi Arabian rela-
tionship. Although government statistics note the 
economy is still growing, the accuracy of these state-
ments can be questioned, arguing that Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates are effectively under-
writing the Bahraini economy.
Security
On foreign affairs, the Bahraini government feels secure, 
with its alliances with the US and the UK, symbolised 
by their respective military bases in Bahrain, giving it a 
free hand to do what it wants domestically. The Bahraini 
government’s repression of the protests will likely 
continue, leading to the long-term ‘securitisation’ of the 
conflict. This strategy will be aided by a plentiful supply 
of foreign, largely Sunni, military personnel, many of 
whom may be given Bahraini citizenship – a conscious 
political tactic of the Bahrani government to reduce the 
power of the Shi’a opposition.
The speaker argued that the status quo was unlikely to 
change, except in case of unexpected regional events, 
such as a regional war, a large increase in the protests 
in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia or a significant 
strengthening of IS in the Gulf. Given these events are 
possible but unlikely, it is conceivable that sections of 
the opposition may attempt to militarise the conflict in 
an attempt to push for change. This outcome, some 
argued, was encouraged by the Bahraini government’s 
repression of the nonviolent opposition.
Discussion
There was a consensus among participants that large-
scale political and economic reform was needed in 
Bahrain but would not be delivered by the current 
Bahraini government or the newly elected parlia-
ment. Although some differences of opinion within 
the Bahraini government do exist, these tend to be 
strategic differences about how to best deal with the 
protests and ‘how to share the cake between the 
ruling elite’. Focussing on replacing senior individuals 
was unhelpful, noted one participant, as a change of 
Prime Minister, for example, would not address the 
dysfunctional political system in Bahrain. One partic-
ipant highlighted the difference between institutional 
reform and democracy, noting that although Bahrain 
had elections and a parliament it was still ruled by 
hundreds of royal decrees.
Regarding the economy, several participants noted that 
Bahrain was no longer in control of its own economy, 
its economic sovereignty fatally compromised by the 
Saudi Arabian intervention in February 2011. Today, 
Bahrain is a de-facto economic ward of Saudi Arabia. 
One participant argued that if economic sovereignty 
doesn’t exist, neither does political sovereignty.
Several participants raised the possibility that the large-
scale naturalisation of Sunnis may leave Shi’as in a 
minority in the future. This was also fuelling tensions 
and cleavages in the Sunni communities, the divisions 
beneficial to the Bahraini government, according to 
some participants.
There was a consensus among the participants that, 
moving forward, the Bahraini government was in a 
favourable position, fortified by the de-facto support of 
the US and, especially, the UK, and was likely to remain 
in power for the foreseeable future. With little opportu-
nity for change within the formal political system, it was 
likely that sections of the opposition may look to more 
radical, possibly violent, tactics to push for change.
